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Abstract
The transaction cost theory predicts that firms are inclined to vertically integrate transac-
tions in response to the specificity of their required inputs. Yet, reality proves that some
firms engage in repeated transactions with external suppliers aimed at procuring highly
specific inputs. To explain this phenomenon, this paper investigates a firm’s make-or-buy
decision in a context with relational (i.e. non-enforceable) contracts, and exposes how
this decision is affected by the required input specificity. This paper demonstrates that
a high degree of input specificity can lead to repeated market transactions being favored
over vertical integration because demanding more specific inputs is shown to (i) impose
lower costs on firms to maintain repeated market transactions founded on relational con-
tracts; and (ii), facilitate the self-enforcement of these relational contracts.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Coase [1937], a stream of economic literature has emerged to ex-
plain why firms exist and utilize non-market in place of market transactions.1 However, a fun-
damental question remains relatively unanswered: What are the conditions driving firms to
integrate transactions? As Williamson [1971, 1979, 1985] and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian
[1978] argued, high levels of quasi-rents due to relation-specific investments increase the
likelihood of vertical integration.2 In the same vein, the procurement of highly specific in-
puts requires relation-specific investments such that input specificity can be considered as
an important driver for vertical integration. Market transactions in competitive markets thus
appear to be beneficial so long as buyers do not rely on relatively specific inputs. However,
if firms were to require highly specific inputs, the value of market transactions appears to
be limited because supplying firms may not make the necessary relation-specific investments
in anticipation of hold-up.3 This suggests a strong relationship between the degree of input
specificity and firms’ tendency to vertically integrate transactions. For instance, as reported
by Monteverde and Teece [1982], car manufacturers like Ford and General Motors procure
standardized inputs like mirrors, carpeting, safety belts, and wires from external suppliers. In
contrast, engines and automatic transmissions—which are highly specific inputs that must be
tailored to car manufacturers’ particular technical requirements—-are internally produced.
Contrary to this prediction however, the dependency on highly specific inputs does not
always lead to vertical integration. For example, Boeing and Airbus rely on highly specific
turbofan engines for producing commercial airplanes. According to the transaction cost the-
ory, we would expect both firms to vertically integrate the production of aircraft engines.
1See Joskow [1988] and Demsetz [1988] for early, and Foss, Lando, and Thomsen [1998] and Holmström
and Roberts [1998] for more recent surveys.
2For more thoroughly discussions refer to Riordan and Williamson [1985], Joskow [1988], and Demsetz
[1988].
3The Fisher Body - General Motors case reported in Klein et al. [1978] and further analyzed by Klein [1988,
2000] is a widely used example for illustrating hold-up. For a summary of extreme examples of hold-up see
Shavell [2005].
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Instead, Boeing and Airbus acquire custom-tailored engines from external producers: Rolls
Royce or CFM International (a joint venture between General Electric and the French com-
pany Snecma). The relationships between the suppliers of aircraft engines—Rolls Royce and
CFM—and their customers—Boeing and Airbus—are characterized by (incomplete) long-
term contracts imposing significant relation-specific investments on the supplying side. For
example, Rolls Royce tailored the turbofan engine Trent XWB to the specific requirements
of the Airbus A350 XWB family, and developed the Trent 900 series to power exclusively the
new Airbus A380. Furthermore, CFM designed the turbofan engine CFM56-3 exclusively for
Boeing aircrafts. Other engines produced by CFM, like the CFM56-5 series, are only used
by Airbus for its commercial airplanes. Chiu [1998] makes a similar observation and argues
that the correlation between relation-specific investments and vertical integration is not as
strong as the theory predicts.4 Two questions therefore emerge: First, how does the degree
of input specificity affect a firm’s input procurement? Second, can input specificity serve as
a rationale for the aforementioned counterintuitive phenomenon? This paper endeavors to
answer these questions by elaborating on a firm’s make-or-buy decision in light of the speci-
ficity of required inputs. By shedding light on how a firm’s input procurement is affected by
the desired input specificity, this study closes a prevailing gap in the literature on the theory
of the firm, and thus enhances our understanding of a firm’s choice for inter- vs. intra-firm
transactions.
By utilizing a framework similar to the one developed by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy
[2002], this paper demonstrates that a firm relying on highly specific inputs can indeed favor
repeated market transactions over vertical integration. The rationale for this observation is a
follows. First, demanding more specific inputs impairs supplying firms’ bargaining positions
in repeated trading relationships. This in turn imposes lower costs on demanding firms to
maintain repeated market transactions founded on relational contracts. Second, a higher de-
gree of input specificity facilitates the self-enforcement of relational contracts between firms,
thereby inducing the efficient level of relation-specific investments. Thus, this paper offers a
4Whinston [2003] points to the same observation by noting that some firms even increase their mutual
dependency e.g. by agreeing upon exclusive contracts.
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theoretical underpinning of the seemingly contradictory phenomenon that some firms utilize
repeated market transactions for procuring highly specific inputs.
The framework analyzed in this paper is characterized by two distinctive features. First,
this study considers a firm’s make-or-buy decision in a context with relational contracts. Gen-
erally, relational (or implicit) contracts refer to contracts, for which some elements are not
enforceable by third parties [MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989], or are prohibitively costly to
specify ex ante [Baker et al., 2002]. As documented in contemporary literature, relational
contracts need to be self-enforcing in repeated games in order to eliminate opportunistic be-
havior. In particular, the framework in this paper comprises relational contracts within firms
as analyzed by Bull [1987], Pearce and Stacchetti [1998], and Levin [2003]; and between
firms as considered by Telser [1980], Klein and Leffler [1981], and Itoh and Morita [2006].
Second, to model varying degrees of input specificity, the productive party is assumed to be
charged with implementing multidimensional effort. An underlying premise of this modeling
technique resides in the fact that the implementation of differential effort allocations leads to
intermediate products with distinguishable characteristics. An intuitive example concerns
the implementation of enterprise-oriented technological solutions (e.g., SAP) in consultation
with either an internal IT department or external IT consultants. The specific configuration of
these technological solutions encompasses several components, and is thus multidimensional.
By emphasizing different components, IT specialists have the choice of devising a generic
technological solution which can be adopted by several firms versus one which matches the
unique requirements of a particular firm (but may be unserviceable for others). Therefore,
the implementation of different effort allocations (e.g., emphasizing varying combinations
of technical components) can yield intermediate products (e.g., technological solutions) with
distinctive characteristics. This approach allows the utilization of a simple and intuitive mea-
sure of input specificity, which keeps the analysis in this paper highly tractable. More pre-
cisely, the employed measure captures the extent to which the effort allocation—and thus
the specific characteristics of the input—desired by a particular firm deviates from the one
required by other market participants.
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As emphasized above, the framework in this paper builds partially on the model de-
vised by Baker et al. [2002], who analyzed the efficiency of vertical integration versus non-
integration within the context of relational contracts. Particularly, they investigated how as-
set ownership facilitates the attainment of superior relational contracts within and between
firms. Despite being rooted in the model developed by Baker et al. [2002], the present con-
ceptualization differs in two fundamental aspects. First, contrary to Baker et al. [2002], the
worker (in case of integration) lacks sufficient financial resources such that making him an
autonomous input supplier (outsourcing) by selling him the asset is not feasible. For the
approach pursued in this paper, non-integration refers to transactions performed with an ex-
isting market participant acting as an independent input supplier. Although this difference
does not appear to be substantial at first glance, it is shown to exert a significant impact on
a firm’s make-or-buy decision. A potential transfer price of the asset should naturally affect
a firm’s outsourcing decision, which in turn will be highly sensitive to the applied valuation
method of the asset.5 Because Baker et al. [2002] focused on the efficiency of alternative
organizational forms (integration vs. non-integration) by comparing the total surplus gener-
ated under each alternative, this ’asset valuation problem’ does not arise in their framework.
By abstracting from incentive effects associated with asset ownership, it is well known that
transferring the property rights of an asset at a certain price determines the allocation of eco-
nomic rents, but leaves the entire surplus unaffected. The objective of this paper, however,
is to shed light on how a firm’s make-or-buy decision is affected by the desired degree of
input specificity. In this respect, the allocation of rents does matter. Further, the incorpora-
tion of a limited liability constraint on the side of the worker not only better reflects the trend
that workers rarely possess sufficient resources to act as autonomous input suppliers, it is
also a viable means to make the analysis in this paper and its findings independent of poten-
tial asset valuation methods. Finally, to identify a firm’s optimal make-or-buy decision, this
paper compares the profitability of alternative methods of input procurement from a firm’s
5More precisely, it is crucial whether the transfer price is assumed to reflect the market value of the asset, or
the present value of the worker’s future profits which he expects to obtain as an independent input supplier.
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perspective, which constitutes the second fundamental difference to Baker et al. [2002] as
they contrast respective efficiencies from a social perspective.
Extant literature on the theory of the firm focused on two important drivers for vertical in-
tegration. Firstly, the property rights approach as devised by Grossman and Hart [1986], Hart
and Moore [1990], and Bolton and Whinston [1993], paid attention to the efficient allocation
of asset ownership as a means to induce sufficient relation-specific investments. The efficient
ownership structure of assets in a context with relational contracts is further investigated by
Garvey [1995], Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy [2001], Bragelien [2001], Baker et al. [2002],
and Halonen [2002]. Second, asset specificity as a potential explanatory contribution to the
theory of the firm—originated in the modern transaction cost theory a lá Williamson [1971,
1979, 1985]—is thoroughly analyzed by Riordan and Williamson [1985], Suzuki [2005],
Kvaløy [2007], and Ruzzier [2007].6 Asset specificity governs incentives for the contract-
ing parties to behave opportunistically by taking advantage of the fact that investments in
relation-specific assets are not entirely reversible. Accordingly, the need for significant in-
vestments in relation-specific assets is deemed as an argument for vertical integration.7
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the analyzed eco-
nomic environment. The optimal contracts under a firm’s alternative input procurements are
derived in section 3. In section 4, a firm’s optimal make-or-buy decision is identified; and
6Input specificity differs from asset specificity in two principal aspects. First, using specific assets is not
a necessity for custom-tailoring intermediate products. Even a generic asset can be utilized to produce highly
specific intermediate products. The key is how this asset is being utilized in the production process. As a simple
example consider the customization of marble plates for kitchen counters or window sills. The asset required to
cut marble plates—a diamond saw—can be utilized to produce plates ranging from standard to highly specific
sizes. In this sense, firms can produce intermediate products characterized by different degrees of specificity
without necessarily investing in specific assets. Second, in contrast to the acquisition of specific assets, pro-
ducing specific intermediate products is a repeated investment decision (which also involves the transfer of
associated property rights), implying that a firm is not entirely tied to these (relation-specific) investments in the
future.
7See also the discussion by Masten [1984] and Whinston [2003].
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investigated in light of how it is affected by different required degrees of input specificity.
Section 5 summarizes the main results and concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a risk-neutral market participant (firm) henceforth referred to as the downstream
party. In every period, the downstream party requires an intermediate product to sustain her
production. The downstream party owns an asset which can be utilized to produce this input.
However, the downstream party lacks either the ability or the time to produce the input by
herself.
The downstream party can choose among two alternatives for procuring the required in-
put: (i) she can purchase the input from another risk-neutral market participant (firm) hence-
forth referred to as the upstream party (market transaction); or (ii), she can vertically inte-
grate its production (integration). The upstream party owns an identical asset as the down-
stream party such that their production technologies are comparable. If the downstream party
decides to integrate the production of the required input, she depends on a worker as pro-
ductive party. The worker is risk-neutral and financially constrained. For parsimony, his
reservation utility is zero.
All parties interact for an infinite number of periods and share the same interest rate
r.8 In every period, depending on the chosen type of transaction, either the worker (W )
or the upstream party (U ) produces the input by implementing non-verifiable effort ei =
(ei1, ei2)
T ∈ R2+, i = W,U .9 Effort imposes strictly convex increasing costs C(ei) =
cie
T
i ei/2, i = W,U , where for parsimony cW = 1. To reflect potential agency costs of
production for the upstream party, let cU ≥ 1.
The characteristics of the input are determined by the implemented effort allocation. Let
µ = (µ1, µ2)
T ∈ R2+ and ω = (ω1, ω2)T ∈ R2+ represent the relative effort allocation—
8Infinitely living parties can be obtained by assuming overlapping generations of individuals who in turn
live only a certain number of periods [Thomas and Worrall, 1988].
9All vectors are column vectors, where ‘T ’ denotes the transpose.
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and therefore the attributes of the input—desired by the downstream party and other market
participants, respectively. Consequently, the degree of input specificity required by the down-
stream party can then be measured by the geometric relation of µ and ω: the angle ϕ. The
greater ϕ is, the more specific is the intermediate product required by the downstream party.
The degree of input specificity—measured by ϕ—is exogenously determined by the down-
stream’s processing technology which the input is required for.10 To reduce the notational
burden, it is assumed that ‖µ‖ = ‖ω‖ = 1, i.e. the lengths of µ and ω are normalized to one.
As mentioned above, the implemented effort allocation—and hence the properties of the
input—determines its value for the downstream party and for other market participants. In
particular, the downstream’s (internal) value I and the market (external) valueE can be either
high (indexed by H) or low (indexed by L), where ∆I ≡ IH − IL and ∆E ≡ EH −EL. The
internal and external input values are observable by all involved entities, but non-verifiable
by third parties. Let
Prob{I = IH |ei} = min{µTei, 1},
Prob{E = EH |ei} = min{ωTei, 1}
be the conditionally independent probabilities that the high internal and high external in-
put values will be realized. Observe that maximizing the expected internal value requires a
different effort allocation than maximizing the expected external value if µ and ω are lin-
early independent. In this case, the downstream party requires a specific input with certain
attributes diverging from those desired by other market participants. Independent of the real-
ized input value however, the downstream party always prefers an internal use to sustain her
production. Formally, this requires that IH > IL ≥ EH > EL, where EL is normalized to
zero. Finally, to ensure interior solutions, it is assumed that ∆I,∆E < 1.11
10I discuss in section 5 a firm’s choice with respect to the specificity of required inputs if the production
technology allows to process intermediate products with different characteristics.
11Alternatively, one can let ∆I,∆E > 1 by assuming that µTµ and ωTω are sufficiently small. In this case,
the lengths of µ and ω appear in the subsequent solutions. Since this does not provide additional insights, I
opted for the first alternative for parsimony purposes.
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For both types of transactions being considered—vertical integration and market exchange—
the downstream party can utilize either a spot contract (spot integration, spot market), or a
relational contract contingent on the non-verifiable, but observable input values (relational
integration, relational market). If the involved parties agree upon a relational contract, they
play a grim trigger strategy: Once they detect a violation of implicit obligations, they will
never rely on relational contracts with the violator again.
3 Alternative Input Procurements
In the subsequent sections, I elaborate on the downstream’s alternatives to procure the re-
quired input: (i) spot integration, (ii) relational integration, (iii) spot market; and (iv), rela-
tional market. This eventually allows me to identify the optimal input procurement from the
downstream’s perspective, and to illustrate the effect of input specificity on her make-or-buy
decision.
3.1 Spot Integration
Consider first the case where the downstream party recruits the worker as the productive party
for one period. Since verifiable information about the realized input value is not available,
the downstream party cannot provide the worker with a court-enforceable incentive contract.
Nevertheless, the downstream party can promise the worker to pay a bonus in the event
that the high internal input value IH is realized. Once this occurs however, the downstream
party can take the input without paying the promised bonus since she owns the asset and
possesses the associated property rights [Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990].
Anticipating this opportunistic behavior, the worker maximizes his utility by implementing
eW = (0, 0)
T such that the downstream party obtains ΠD|SI = IL under spot integration.
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3.2 Relational Integration
If the downstream party repeatedly interacts with the worker, a relational incentive contract
can be self-enforcing, and therefore credible from the worker’s perspective. In particular, to
motivate effort, the downstream party can promise to pay the worker a bonus β in addition
to a fixed transfer α in the event that the high internal input value IH is realized. As a
consequence of the implicit nature of this bonus contract, the downstream’s promise to pay
β needs to be reliable. Let Π˜RI ≡ max{ΠD|SI ,ΠD|SM ,ΠD|RM} denote the downstream’s
expected profit obtained under her best alternative after violating the relational employment
contract with the worker. After behaving opportunistically by reneging on β, the downstream
party can henceforth either choose spot integration (SI), or engage in market transactions
with the upstream party based upon explicit (SM ) or implicit (RM ) contracts. Suppose for
a moment that the high internal input value IH is eventually realized. Then, the downstream
party honors her implicit obligation to pay β if
−β + Π
D|RI
r
≥ Π˜
RI
r
. (1)
The left side of (1) represents the downstream’s expected payoff when she delivers on her
promise, i.e. paying the bonus β but obtaining the expected profit under relational integration
ΠD|RI in the future. To be deterred from reneging, this payoff needs to be greater than the
present value of her best fallback position Π˜RI . If this self-enforcement condition is satisfied,
the worker anticipates the downstream party to deliver on her promise to pay β whenever
I = IH such that he is motivated to implement effort.
The optimal relational employment contract maximizes the difference between the ex-
pected internal input value and the worker’s expected wage payment. Hence, the down-
stream’s problem can be formalized as follows:12
12Maximizing the downstream’s expected profit for a single period is equivalent to maximizing the present
value of all future expected profits. This can be deduced because reneging does not occur in the reputational
equilibrium, which in turn implies that the downstream’s expected profits for every single period are identical.
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max
α,β,eW
ΠD|RI = IL + ∆IµTeW − α− βµTeW (2)
s.t.
α + βµTeW − 1
2
eTWeW ≥ 0 (3)
eW ∈ arg max
e˜W
α + βµT e˜W − 1
2
e˜TW e˜W (4)
α + β ≥ 0 (5)
α ≥ 0 (6)
IL + ∆Iµ
TeW − α− βµTeW − Π˜RI ≥ βr. (7)
Condition (3) is the worker’s participation constraint and ensures that it is in his interest
to enter into this employment relationship. Further, (4) constitutes the worker’s incentive
constraint, implying that he implements eW = βµ in order to maximize his expected utility.
Constraints (5) and (6) guarantee that the relational employment contract is compatible with
the worker’s liability limit. Finally, (7) is the self-enforcement condition (derived from (1))
ensuring that the downstream party is not tempted to renege on β.
The subsequent proposition characterizes the downstream’s expected profit under the op-
timal employment contract (α∗, β∗) by utilizing two threshold interest rates, rRI and r̂RI . For
parsimony, the optimal contracts as well as the threshold interest rates for this and subsequent
propositions are characterized in the respective proof in the appendix.
Proposition 1 By utilizing the optimal relational employment contract (α∗, β∗) under inte-
gration, the downstream’s expected profit is
ΠD|RI(r) =

IL +
1
4
(∆I)2, if r ≤ rRI
r
2
[∆I − r + 2φ] + Π˜RI , if rRI < r ≤ r̂RI
IL, if r̂RI < r,
(8)
where
φ ≡
[
1
4
(∆I − r)2 + IL − Π˜RI
] 1
2
.
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Proof All proofs are given in the appendix.
For a sufficiently low interest rate r ≤ rRI , the downstream party can credibly commit
to pay the efficient bonus β∗ = ∆I/2. In this case, the value of a sustained employment
relationship based upon a relational incentive contract eliminates the downstream’s tempta-
tion to renege on β∗. The worker anticipates that the downstream party would deliver on her
promise to pay β∗ and is therefore motivated to implement the efficient (second-best) effort
e∗W = ∆Iµ/2. For r
RI < r ≤ r̂RI however, the downstream’s promise to pay the efficient
bonus β∗ = ∆I/2 is not credible from the worker’s perspective. This is because a higher
interest rate r imposes a less severe ‘penalty’ on the downstream party for violating the rela-
tional incentive contract with the worker. In such a situation, the worker anticipates that the
downstream party would behave opportunistically by reneging on β∗, and would thus refuse
to implement effort. To motivate the worker nonetheless to implement effort, the downstream
party is compelled to adjust the bonus β in order to ensure it satisfies the self-enforcement
condition (7). However, the more the credible bonus β∗(r) deviates from the efficient bonus
β∗ = ∆I/2, the lower is the downstream’s expected profit ΠD|RI(r). Finally, if r > r̂RI , the
downstream party cannot find a strictly positive bonus which eliminates her reneging temp-
tation. As a result, β∗(r) = 0, and the downstream party obtains the same expected profit as
under spot integration.
3.3 Spot Market
Instead of utilizing an integrated production, the downstream party can alternatively procure
the input from the upstream party through a spot market exchange. Under this arrangement,
both parties negotiate in every period about a price ΥSM in exchange for the input. As in
Baker et al. [2002], this price is obtained by applying the Nash-Bargaining solution with
equal bargaining powers. Accordingly, the downstream party pays the external input value E
plus half of the surplus I − E for its internal use so that ΥSM = [I + E]/2.
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The upstream party chooses effort eU with the objective of maximizing his expected profit
ΠU |SM = E[ΥSM |eU ]− C(eU), which is equivalent to
max
eU
ΠU |SM =
1
2
[
IL + ∆Iµ
TeU + ∆Eω
TeU
]− 1
2
cUe
T
UeU . (9)
As can be deduced from the first-order condition, the upstream party chooses
e∗U =
1
2cU
[∆Iµ+ ∆Eω] . (10)
Apparently, the upstream party intends to maximize the internal and external input value
with the aim of improving his own expected bargaining position, and hence, the price he
expects to obtain. Observe further that the upstream party does not perfectly tailor the input
to the downstream’s requirements if µ 6= λω, λ > 0. In this case, adjusting the input to the
downstream’s and to other market participants’ needs are two competing objectives. In other
words, tailoring the input exclusively to the downstream’s requirements would constitute a
relation-specific investment, which—due to the nature of one-time transactions with irre-
versible investments—would provoke opportunistic behavior on the side of the downstream
party, commonly referred to as hold-up.
If the upstream party anticipates a spot market transaction with the downstream party, he
implements e∗U . Hence, his expected profit is
ΠU |SM =
1
2
IL +
1
8cU
[
(∆I)2 + (∆E)2 + 2∆I∆E cosϕ
]
. (11)
Note that the upstream’s expected profit is decreasing in the degree of input specificity ϕ
which is desired by the downstream party. This can be observed because the upstream’s
trade-off between tailoring the input to the downstream’s specific requirements and adjusting
the input to the market’s (general) needs becomes more severe. This eventually deteriorates
the upstream’s expected bargaining position, and as a consequence, leads to a smaller ex-
pected premium for selling the input to the downstream party in place of the other market
participants.
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If the downstream party decides in favor of spot market exchange with the upstream party,
her expected profit ΠD|SM is the difference between the expected internal input value and the
price she expects to pay. Formally, ΠD|SM = E[I −ΥSM |e∗U ], which is equivalent to
ΠD|SM =
1
2
IL +
1
4cU
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] . (12)
At first glance, the downstream’s expected profit under spot exchange is independent of the
required input specificity measured by ϕ. However, from a closer inspection of the expected
internal input value E[I|e∗U ] and the expected price E[ΥSM |e∗U ] it becomes clear that there
are two countervailing effects of ϕ on ΠD|SM . In particular, it can be shown that
∂ E[I|e∗U ]
∂ϕ
=
∂ E[ΥSM |e∗U ]
∂ϕ
= − 1
2cU
∆I∆E sinϕ. (13)
Accordingly, an increase in ϕ leads to a lower expected internal input value, but also to a
lower price the downstream party expects to pay. Since the magnitudes of both effects are
identical, they cancel each other out such that ΠD|SM is eventually not affected by the desired
degree of input specificity. Generally speaking, a lower expected price perfectly compensates
the downstream party for the expected exchange of an insufficiently tailored input.
3.4 Relational Market
As demonstrated in the preceding section, utilizing spot market transactions with the up-
stream party leads to the procurement of insufficiently tailored inputs due to the upstream’s
reluctance to make relation-specific investments. To ensure the exchange of perfectly tailored
inputs however, the downstream party can promise the upstream party to pay a certain amount
conditional on the realized internal input value I . This is aimed at motivating the upstream
party to make relation-specific investments because tailoring inputs to the downstream’s re-
quirements irretrievably impairs their expected market value.
Let PL denote the floor payment both parties consent to in an enforceable contract for
exchanging the input, regardless of its final value. In addition, to motivate relation-specific
investments in the sense of tailoring the input, the downstream party promises to pay the
upstream party a higher price PH if I = IH . Thus, this contract consists of an explicit
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component PL and a non-enforceable premium ∆P ≡ PH−PL. The upstream party however,
is only motivated to tailor the input if the downstream’s promise to pay the premium ∆P is
perceived as reliable.
To derive the self-enforcement condition for relational market transactions, let Π˜RM ≡
max{ΠD|SI ,ΠD|RI ,ΠD|SM} denote the downstream’s expected profit which she obtains un-
der her best fallback position. Now suppose for a moment that the high internal input value
IH is eventually realized. The downstream party is not tempted to hold up the upstream party
by reneging on ∆P if
−∆P + Π
D|RM
r
≥ Π˜
RM
r
. (14)
The downstream party adheres to her promise if paying the premium ∆P but perpetuating the
long-term trading relationship with the upstream party provides her with a higher expected
profit than her best fallback position.
In addition to satisfying the self-enforcement condition (14), the payments PL and PH
need to guarantee that it is in the upstream’s interest to enter into a long-term trading rela-
tionship with the downstream party founded on relational contracts. This requires that the
upstream party is at least weakly better off under relational market transactions with the
downstream party than under his best alternative. It is crucial here to note that the upstream’s
best alternative is directly linked to the downstream’s best fallback position. If the down-
stream’s best fallback is to utilize spot market exchange, the upstream’s reservation profit is
ΠU |SM as derived in section 3.3. By contrast, if vertical integration is the downstream’s best
alternative, the upstream’s reservation profit is the one he obtains by selling the intermediate
product on the market at the market price ΥM = E. In this case, it can be shown that the
upstream party implements e∗U = ∆Eω/cU , which in turn provides him with the expected
profit
ΠU |M =
1
2cU
(∆E)2. (15)
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The objective of the optimal relational contract is to maximize the difference between the
expected internal input value and the expected payment to the upstream party. The down-
stream’s problem can thus be formalized as follows:
max
PL,PH ,eU
ΠD|RM = IL + ∆IµTeU − PL −∆PµTeU (16)
s.t.
PL + ∆Pµ
TeU − 1
2
cUe
T
UeU ≥ Π¯U (17)
eU ∈ arg max
e˜U
PL + ∆Pµ
T e˜U − 1
2
cU e˜
T
U e˜U (18)
IL + ∆Iµ
TeU − PL −∆PµTeU − Π˜RM ≥ ∆Pr, (19)
where
Π¯U =

1
2
IL +
1
8cU
[∆Iµ+ ∆Eω]2 , if Π˜RM = ΠD|SM
1
2cU
(∆E)2, if Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM ,
(20)
represents the upstream’s reservation profit which is—as previously explained—conditional
on the downstream’s best fallback position. Condition (17) is the upstream’s participation
constraint guaranteeing that the proposed relational contract makes him at least weakly better
off than his best alternative. Further, (18) is the upstream’s incentive constraint, implying
that he implements e∗U = ∆Pµ/cU in order to maximize his expected profit. Finally, the
self-enforcement condition (19) (derived from (14)) ensures that the downstream party is not
tempted to renege on the non-enforceable premium ∆P .
As discussed above, the upstream’s reservation profit can take one of two values con-
ditional on the downstream’s best fallback position. For the sake of lucidity, I subsequently
consider both cases separately. The next proposition characterizes the downstream’s expected
profit under relational market transactions if her best alternative is spot market exchange.
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Proposition 2 Suppose Π˜RM = ΠD|SM , i.e. the downstream’s best alternative is spot mar-
ket exchange. Then, by utilizing the optimal relational contract (P ∗L, P
∗
H) for repeated trans-
actions with the upstream party, the downstream’s expected profit is
ΠD|RM(r) =

1
2
IL +
1
2cU
(∆I)2 − 1
8cU
[∆Iµ+ ∆Eω]2 , if r ≤ rRM
r
[
∆I − rcU + φ 12
]
+ ΠD|SM , if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM
ΠD|SM , if r̂RM < r,
(21)
where
φ ≡ (∆I − rcU)2 − 1
4
(∆Iµ+ ∆Eω)2 − cU
(
2ΠD|SM − IL
)
.
As long as the mutually shared interest rate r is sufficiently low (i.e., r ≤ rRM ), the down-
stream party honors her non-enforceable obligation to pay the optimal premium ∆P ∗ = ∆I if
I = IH .13 In this case, the upstream party anticipates that hold-up will not occur, and is there-
fore motivated to make the desired relation-specific investment in the sense of tailoring the
input to the downstream’s requirements. In contrast, if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM , the downstream’s
promise to pay the efficient premium ∆P ∗ is not credible from the upstream’s perspective.
In such a situation, motivating relation-specific investments necessitates the adjustment of
the premium ∆P ∗(r) targeted at ensuring it satisfy the self-enforcement condition (19). The
provision of an inefficient (but credible) premium ∆P ∗(r) however, inevitably leads to a
lower expected profit for the downstream party. Finally, if r > r̂RM , the downstream party
cannot find a strictly positive and reliable premium ∆P whose effectiveness would not be
jeopardized by her temptation to hold up the upstream party. As a logical consequence, the
upstream party refuses to make relation-specific investments such that the downstream party
obtains the same expected profit as under spot market exchange.
To gain further insights, one can re-write ΠD|RM for r ≤ rRM as14
ΠD|RM =
1
2
IL +
1
2cU
(∆I)2 − 1
8cU
[
(∆I)2 + (∆E)2 + 2∆I∆E cosϕ
]
. (22)
13See proof of proposition 2 in the appendix for the characterization of the optimal relational contract.
14To see this, note that µTω = ‖µ‖‖ω‖ cosϕ, where ‖µ‖ = ‖ω‖ = 1.
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If spot market exchange constitutes her best alternative input procurement, the downstream’s
expected profit ΠD|RM clearly depends on the degree of the desired input specificity measured
by ϕ. The rationale for this observation is as follows: Ensuring the upstream’s participation
requires that he obtains at least the same expected profit in a long-term relationship with the
downstream party founded on relational contracts as under mutual spot exchange. The floor
payment PL thus reflects the upstream’s reservation profit ΠU |SM , which in turn is a function
of the input specificity measure ϕ, see section 3.3. As a natural consequence, the degree of
input specificity also affects the downstream’s expected profit under relational market trans-
actions if spot exchange is her best alternative. More precisely, as discussed in section 3.3,
a higher degree of input specificity (greater ϕ) deteriorates the upstream’s expected profit
ΠU |SM under spot market exchange. This in turn makes it less costly for the downstream
party to ensure the upstream’s participation, which translates into a higher expected profit
ΠD|RM . The same inferences with respect to the downstream’s expected profit ΠD|RM can be
made for the case where rRM < r ≤ r̂RM .
To get a more complete picture of how the desired input specificity measured by ϕ affects
the profitability of a long-term relationship with the upstream party, consider the threshold
interest rate rRM , which is characterized in the proof of proposition 2 in the appendix:
rRM =
1
8∆IcU
[
(∆I)2 + (∆E)2 − 2∆I∆E cosϕ] . (23)
The threshold interest rate rRM is apparently increasing in the specificity measure ϕ. This
implies that the downstream’s promise to pay the efficient premium ∆P ∗ = ∆I becomes
credible even for higher interest rates if the downstream party relies on more specific inputs.
This inference is rooted in the previously made observation that a higher degree of input
specificity augments the downstream’s expected profit under relational market transactions.
This in turn imposes a more severe ‘penalty’ on the downstream party for reneging on the
non-enforceable premium ∆P , which is reflected by a higher threshold interest rate rRM . It is
straightforward to verify that the same conclusion can be drawn for r̂RM . These observations
are in line with Halonen [2002] who points out that less attractive outside options alleviate
incentives to behave opportunistically.
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To complete the analysis in this section, it remains to characterize the downstream’s ex-
pected profit under relational market transactions in case vertical integration constitutes her
best alternative.
Proposition 3 Suppose Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM , i.e. the downstream’s best alternative is vertical
integration. Then, by utilizing the optimal relational contract (P ∗L, P
∗
H) for repeated transac-
tions with the upstream party, the downstream’s expected profit is
ΠD|RM(r) =

IL +
1
2cU
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] , if r ≤ rRM
r
[
∆I − rcU + φ 12
]
+ Π˜RM , if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM
ΠD|SM , if r̂RM < r,
(24)
where
φ ≡ (∆I − rcU)2 − (∆E)2 − 2cU
(
Π˜RM − IL
)
.
In principle, the relationship between the mutually shared interest rate r and the down-
stream’s expected profit as previously exposed for the case Π˜RM = ΠD|SM also applies in
the event that Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM . Observe however, that the downstream’s expected profit
ΠD|RM(r) is now independent of the input specificity measure ϕ. The reason is as follows:
Since the downstream’s best fallback position is to vertically integrate the production of the
input, selling the intermediate product on the market constitutes the upstream’s (only) alter-
native. As revealed in the previous analysis, the upstream’s reservation profit ΠU |SM is then
independent of the input specificity measure ϕ, which in turn leaves the optimal relational
contract (P ∗L, P
∗
H), and hence the downstream’s expected profit Π
D|RM(r), also unaffected.
4 Input Procurement and Input Specificity
This section identifies the optimal method of input procurement from the perspective of the
downstream party. This in turn facilitates a thorough analysis and discussion of how the
downstream’s make-or-buy decision is affected by the required degree of input specificity.
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To ease the subsequent characterization of the downstream’s optimal input procurement,
let us first identify the optimal spot contract. To do so, suppose for a moment that the mu-
tually shared interest rate r is sufficiently high such that both considered relational con-
tracts (i.e. relational integration and relational market) are not feasible. Formally, this re-
quires that r > max{r̂RI , r̂RM}. It is straightforward to verify that ΠD|SM ≥ ΠD|SI for
r > max{r̂RI , r̂RM} is equivalent to
(∆E)2 ≤ (∆I)2 − 2cUIL ≡ Θ (25)
As long as relational contracts cannot be attained and (∆E)2 ≤ Θ, procuring the input
through spot market exchange with the upstream party dominates an integrated production.
Put differently, market transactions are superior to vertical integration if the market valuation
towards the difference between the high and low external value of the input is sufficiently low.
The rationale for this observation is rooted in the upstream’s bargaining position. If (∆E)2 ≤
Θ, selling the input to other market participants is relatively unprofitable for the upstream
party, which in turn weakens his bargaining position, and translates into a sufficiently low
exchange price ΥSM for the input. By contrast, if (∆E)2 > Θ, the downstream party strictly
prefers an integrated production of the input because spot market exchange would impose
higher costs due to the upstream’s improved bargaining position.15
Before identifying the downstream’s optimal make-or-buy decision, it is further neces-
sary to compare both considered relational contracts—relational integration and relational
market—with respect to their profitabilities. First, suppose that the interest rate r is suf-
ficiently low such that both relational contracts comprising the efficient incentive schemes
are self-enforcing. Formally, this requires that r ≤ min{rRM , rRI}. I demonstrate in the
15This particulary requires that cU < (∆I)2/(2IL), i.e. the upstream’s production of the input is not too
inefficient relative to the downstream’s production. Otherwise, spot integration would be preferred for all values
of (∆E)2.
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appendix that relational market dominates relational integration from the downstream’s per-
spective (i.e., ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RI), if
(∆E)2 ≤ Φ, if ΠD|SM = Π˜RM (26)
(∆E)2 ≤ Φ, if ΠD|SM 6= Π˜RM . (27)
The downstream’s preference for a particular relational contract is apparently determined by
two different thresholds: Φ and Φ.16 This can be observed because the downstream’s expected
profit for relational market is conditional on whether or not a spot market exchange is her
best fallback position. From the perspective of the downstream party, a long-term trading
relationship with the upstream party (relational market) is generally more profitable than
vertical integration if ∆E is sufficiently low. As previously exposed, a lower ∆E diminishes
the value of the upstream’s outside option and hence, his bargaining position. This in turn
mitigates the downstream’s costs for ensuring the upstream’s participation in a long-term
trading arrangement. Finally, it remains to identify the downstream’s preferred relational
contract and the corresponding thresholds if ri < r ≤ r̂ i, i = RM,RI . For this case, it
has been shown in sections 3.2 and 3.4 that the downstream party is compelled to adjust
the incentive schemes for both relational contracts aimed at ensuring their self-enforcement.
Then, ΠD|RM(r) ≥ ΠD|RI(r), i.e., relational market dominates relational integration, if
(∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r), if Π˜RM = ΠD|SM (28)
(∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r), if Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM , (29)
where (∆E)2 = Ψ(r) implies ΠD|RM(r) = ΠD|RI(r) for Π˜RM = ΠD|SM , and (∆E)2 =
Ψ(r) for Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM respectively.17
After identifying all relevant thresholds, we are now equipped to investigate the down-
stream’s optimal input procurement and its sensitivity to the required degree of input speci-
16For parsimony purposes, the characterization of these two thresholds is relegated to the appendix.
17Due to the structure of ΠD|RM (r) and ΠD|RI(r) for ri < r ≤ r̂ i, i = RM,RI , one cannot obtain
a tractable closed form solution. Nevertheless, utilizing the implicit characterizations does not derogate the
subsequent results.
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ficity. As a first step towards a thorough discussion of how input specificity affects the down-
stream’s make-or-buy decision, the next proposition characterizes the optimal input procure-
ment for different values of r and ∆E.
Proposition 4 The downstream party chooses relational market in the intervals
0 < (∆E)2 ≤ min{Φ,Θ} and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ, if r ≤ rRM ;
0 < (∆E)2 ≤ min{Ψ(r),Θ} and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r), if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM .
In contrast, relational integration is preferred for
Φ < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ and Φ < (∆E)2, if r ≤ rRI ;
Ψ(r) < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ and Ψ(r) < (∆E)2, if rRI < r ≤ r̂RI .
Finally, if r > r̂RM or r > r̂RI in the relevant intervals, the downstream party utilizes spot
market if (∆E)2 ≤ Θ, and spot integration otherwise.
The downstream’s optimal input procurement is illustrated in Figure 1, where the squared
spread of the external input value (∆E)2 as a measure of the upstream’s bargaining posi-
tion is on the horizontal axis, and the interest rate r on the vertical axis.18 Consider first
the downstream’s preferred spot transaction, which eventually determines her best fallback
position for relational contracts. Spot contracts are chosen whenever the mutually shared in-
terest rate r is sufficiently high such that superior relational contracts cannot be attained. As
previously exposed, spot market exchange dominates spot integration if the market valuation
towards the difference between the high and low external value of the input ∆E—and thus
the upstream’s bargaining position—is sufficiently low. By contrast, if the interest rate r is
adequately low, the downstream party can utilize a relational contract to provide either the up-
stream party (relational market) or the worker (relational integration) with effective incentives
18More precisely, Figure 1 represents the downstream’s make-or-buy decision under the premise that
Φ,Ψ(r) > Θ and (∆I)2 cos2 ϕ > Θ. The latter condition implies that r̂RM is convex decreasing in (∆E)2
for 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ min{Ψ(r),Θ}. Furthermore, it can be shown that r̂RI is convex increasing in (∆E)2 if
the application of spot market exchange constitutes the downstream’s best fallback position. In contrast, if spot
integration is her best alternative, r̂RI is constant in (∆E)2.
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Figure 1: Optimal Transactions and Contracts
to tailor the intermediate product to the specific requirements. Particulary, due to the previ-
ously discussed reasons, the downstream party prefers a long-term trading relationship with
the upstream party whenever ∆E—as an indicator of the upstream’s bargaining position—is
sufficiently low; and a repeated employment relationship with the worker otherwise.
To shed more light on the downstream’s make-or-buy decision, suppose for a moment
that r ≤ min{r̂RM , r̂RI}, i.e. both relational contracts are self-enforcing. As can be de-
duced from proposition 4 or Figure 1, relational market is generally superior for low values
of ∆E due to the relatively weak bargaining position of the upstream party. Nevertheless, it
is important here to emphasize that relational integration can be temporarily preferred by the
downstream party in the interval Ψ(r) < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ, whereas for Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r), re-
lational market is again more profitable, see proposition 4. The reason for obtaining spanned
intervals is as follows. Different fallback positions for relational market—spot market ex-
change or integrated spot production—impose diverse costs on the downstream party for
ensuring the upstream’s participation in a long-term trading arrangement. This in turn pro-
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vides the downstream party with differential expected profits, and as a consequence, leads to
diverse threshold interest rates reflecting the feasibility of the respective relational contract.
Note however, that the previous argumentation applies only if Ψ(r) < Θ < Ψ(r), which
depends on the specific parameter values. Otherwise, there exists only one threshold level
of ∆E where the downstream party is indifferent between relational market and relational
integration.
To illustrate the effect of input specificity on the downstream’s make-or-buy decision, sup-
pose that the downstream party requires a more specific intermediate product. Formally, ϕ
increases to ϕ′. As long as spot market exchange constitutes the downstream’s best fallback
position for repeated transactions with the upstream party founded on a relational contract
(Π˜RM = ΠD|SM ), demanding a more specific input leads to the subsequent effects (see also
the discussion in section 3.4). First, utilizing relational market transactions becomes more
profitability for the downstream party due to the weakened bargaining position of the up-
stream party, which in turn causes the thresholds Ψ(r) and Φ to increase. Second, as a direct
consequence of the improved profitability of relational market transactions, the correspond-
ing threshold interest rates rRM and r̂RM increase.
The effect of varying degrees of input specificity on the downstream’s make-or-buy deci-
sion is also depicted in Figure 1, where the dashed lines characterize the new thresholds for
ϕ′. Consider first area A. Here, the downstream party can engage in a superior long-term
trading relationship with the upstream party (relational market), if she relies on a sufficiently
specific input (high ϕ). Otherwise, she would be compelled to utilize less profitable spot
market exchange. Recall that demanding a more specific input—characterized by a higher
ϕ—deteriorates the upstream’s bargaining position for mutual spot exchange. This mitigates
the downstream’s costs for ensuring the upstream’s participation in a long-term trading ar-
rangement, and thus improves her expected profit under relational market. A higher expected
profit under relational market further enhances the downstream’s potential ’penalty’ for vi-
olating the relational contract with the upstream party, which in turn is reflected by higher
threshold interest rates rRM and r̂RM . Generally speaking, the downstream party can now
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motivate the upstream party to make relation-specific investments in the sense of perfectly
tailoring the intermediate product to the specific requirements even for higher interest rates.
Next, consider area B in Figure 1. Here, the downstream party engages in a long-term
trading relationship with the upstream party whenever she relies on sufficiently specific inputs
(high ϕ). Otherwise, for more generic intermediate products, the downstream party would
opt for an integrated production. Accordingly, in area B, demanding highly specific inputs
leads to repeated transactions with an external input supplier (relational market) dominating
vertical integration. Again, this observation is rooted in the impairment of the upstream’s
bargaining position. As discussed, a weaker bargaining position of the upstream party even-
tually improves the profitability of repeated market transactions for the downstream’s party
relative to vertical integration, which in turn is not only reflected by higher threshold interest
rates rRM and r̂RM , but also by a higher threshold Φ′, see Figure 1.
Summarizing the above observations, a firm depending on sufficiently specific interme-
diate products might favor repeated transactions with an external input supplier over vertical
integration for their procurement. This conclusion is rooted in the impairment of the up-
stream’s bargaining position occurring whenever spot market exchange is the downstream’s
best alternative to repeated market transactions. Thus, the analysis in this paper provides a
potential explanation of the phenomenon whereby some firms utilize repeated transactions
with external suppliers for procuring highly specific inputs.
5 Conclusion
Prior literature on the theory of the firm presents a number of reasons why firms might prefer
integrated instead of market transactions. This paper elaborates on the specificity of required
inputs and its effect on a firm’s make-or-buy decision. In doing so, it sheds light on the
contradictory phenomenon that some firms engage in repeated market transactions despite a
strong reliance on highly specific inputs.
The analysis in this paper highlights one import conclusion: A firm might favor repeated
market transactions if the procured input is sufficiently specific. The rationale for this obser-
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vation is as follows. First, demanding a more specific input impairs the supplier’s bargaining
position for mutual market transactions since tailored intermediate products are less likely to
be purchased by other market participants. This in turn imposes lower costs on demanding
firms for sustaining repeated market transactions founded on relational contracts. Second, re-
lying on more specific inputs facilitates the self-enforcement of relational contracts between
firms, which induces the input supplier to make the required relation-specific investments.
This can be observed because repeated transactions with an external input supplier become
sufficiently beneficial for the buyer such that hold up is less likely to occur. This paper thus
provides a theoretical underpinning of why some firms are inclined to favor repeated market
transactions over vertical integration for procuring highly specific inputs.
Indeed, due to the aforementioned reasons, a firm might be better off by procuring highly
specific instead of more standardized intermediate products.19 Throughout this paper, the
desired specificity of an intermediate product is assumed to be exogenous. This is a reason-
able assumption whenever the utilized technology for processing the input does not allow for
variations in its characteristics. Alternatively, firms could invest in production technologies
that give them some latitude to process inputs with differential properties. According to the
analysis in this paper, firms might then prefer to procure the most specific inputs that can still
be processed by their current technologies. In this case, a firm’s choice in terms of the speci-
ficity of the required inputs is made strategically with the aim of deteriorating the supplying
firm’s bargaining position in repeated inter-firm trade.
From a pragmatic standpoint, a strong dependency on highly specific inputs may not
necessarily imply that an internal production is optimal for a firm. Rather, as suggested in
this paper, if inputs can be custom-tailored to the extent to which they cannot be processed
by any other firms, a long-term trading arrangement founded on relational contracts with
an external supplier could be the superior alternative for their procurement. In situations
of relatively exclusive inputs, a firm can therefore exploit the low bargaining position of its
supplier to induce a cost advantage which cannot be replicated within the organization.
19It is crucial to bear in mind that the subsequent argumentation implicitly assumes that additional costs
imposed by tailoring and processing intermediate products are sufficiently low.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Note first that eWi > 0 for at least one i ∈ {1, 2} requires β > 0. Thus, (5) is satisfied if
(6) holds, and can therefore be omitted. Assume for a moment that (7) is satisfied for the
optimal bonus contract. Let λ and ξ denote Lagrange multipliers. Since µTµ = ‖µ‖2 = 1,
the Lagrangian is
L(α, β) = IL + ∆Iβ − α− β2 + λ
[
α +
1
2
β2
]
+ ξα. (30)
The first-order conditions with respect to α and β are
−1 + λ+ ξ = 0, (31)
∆I + β (λ− 2) = 0. (32)
To find a solution of this problem, suppose for a moment that λ > 0. Then, α + β2/2 = 0
due to complementary slackness. Since α ≥ 0, this would imply that α∗ = 0 and β∗ = 0, and
hence, e∗ = (0, 0)T . Thus, λ > 0 cannot be a solution of this problem such that λ = 0, i.e.
the worker’s participation constraint is not binding. We can then infer from (31) that ξ = 1.
Hence, complementary slackness implies that α∗ = 0. Since λ = 0, it follows from (32) that
β∗ = ∆I/2. Substituting β∗ = ∆I/2 in the downstream’s objective function leads to
ΠD|RI = IL + (∆I)2/4. (33)
By substituting ΠD|RI and β∗ = ∆I/2 in (7), we obtain the threshold interest rate rRI :
r ≤ ∆I
2
− 2
∆I
[
Π˜RI − IL
]
≡ rRI . (34)
If r > rRI , the efficient bonus β∗ = ∆I/2 (and any higher bonus β > β∗) would violate
(7). In this case, the downstream party chooses the highest feasible β such that (7) becomes
binding. Let β∗(r) denote the maximum value of β which solves (7), or equivalently,
β2 − (∆I − r)β − IL + Π˜RI = 0 (35)
⇔ β∗(r) = 1
2
(∆I − r)±
[
1
4
(∆I − r)2 + IL − Π˜RI
] 1
2
. (36)
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Since it is optimal to choose the highest feasible β, the upper bound is relevant. Note however,
that there exits only a solution to (36) if
1
4
(∆I − r)2 + IL − Π˜RI ≥ 0. (37)
Then, rearranging (37) yields the lower threshold r̂RI :
r ≤ ∆I ± 2
[
Π˜RI − IL
] 1
2 ≡ r̂RI . (38)
Observe that the upper bound of r̂RI implies β∗(r) < 0, which cannot be a solution. Con-
sequently, the lower bound of r̂RI is relevant. Substituting β∗(r) for rRI < r ≤ r̂RI in the
downstream’s objective function yields
ΠD|RI(r) =
r
2
[
∆I − r + 2
[
1
4
(∆I − r)2 + IL − Π˜RI
] 1
2
]
+ Π˜RI . (39)
Finally, if r > r̂RI , every strictly positive β would violate (7). Thus, the downstream party
sets β∗(r) = 0. As a result, e∗W = (0, 0)
T such that ΠD|RI(r) = IL. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.
Note first that Π˜RM = ΠD|SM implies Π¯U = IL/2 + [∆Iµ+ ∆Eω]
2 /(8cU). To minimize
costs, the downstream party sets PL such that the upstream’s participation constraint (17)
becomes binding. By substituting e∗U = ∆Pµ/cU in (17) and solving for PL, one get
PL =
1
2
IL +
1
8cU
(∆Iµ+ ∆Eω)2 − 1
2cU
(∆P )2. (40)
Now suppose for a moment that (19) is satisfied for the optimal premium ∆P ∗. Substituting
PL and e∗U in the downstream’s objective function yields the simplified problem
max
∆P
ΠD|RM =
1
2
IL +
1
cU
∆I∆P − 1
8cU
(∆Iµ+ ∆Eω)2 − 1
2cU
(∆P )2. (41)
The first-order condition implies ∆P ∗ = ∆I . Hence, the downstream’s expected profit is
ΠD|RM =
1
2
IL +
1
2cU
(∆I)2 − 1
8cU
[∆Iµ+ ∆Eω]2 . (42)
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By substituting ΠD|RM , ΠD|SM , and ∆P ∗ = ∆I in (19), we obtain the threshold interest rate
rRM :
r ≤ 1
8cU∆I
[∆Iµ−∆Eω]2 ≡ rRM . (43)
If r > rRM , the efficient premium ∆P ∗ = ∆I (and any higher premium ∆P > ∆P ∗) would
violate (19). In this case, the downstream party chooses the highest feasible ∆P such that
(19) becomes binding. Let ∆P ∗(r) denote the highest feasible premium which solves (19),
or equivalently,
(∆P )2 − 2(∆I − rcU)∆P + 1
4
(∆Iµ+ ∆Eω)2 + cU
(
2ΠD|SM − IL
)
= 0. (44)
Solving for ∆P yields
∆P ∗(r) = ∆I− rcU ±
[
(∆I − rcU)2 − 1
4
(∆Iµ+ ∆Eω)2 − cU
(
2ΠD|SM − IL
)] 12
. (45)
Since it is optimal to choose the highest feasible ∆P , the upper bound is relevant. However,
there exists only a solution to (45) if
(∆I − rcU)2 − 1
4
(∆Iµ+ ∆Eω)2 − cU
(
2ΠD|SM − IL
) ≥ 0. (46)
Rearranging (46) yields the lower threshold r̂RM :
r ≤ ∆I
cU
± 1
cU
[
1
4
(∆Iµ+ ∆Eω)2 + cU
(
2ΠD|SM − IL
)] 12 ≡ r̂RM . (47)
Notice that the upper bound of r̂RM implies ∆P < 0, which cannot be a solution. Thus,
the lower bound of r̂RM is relevant. Substituting ∆P ∗(r) for rRM < r ≤ r̂RM in the
downstream’s objective function yields
ΠD|RM(r) = r
[
∆I − rcU +
[
(∆I − rcU)2 − 1
4
(∆Iµ+ ∆Eω)2 − cU
(
2ΠD|SM − IL
)] 12]
+ΠD|SM . (48)
Finally, if r > r̂RM , every strictly positive premium ∆P would violate (19). Thus, the down-
stream party sets ∆P ∗ = 0. As a result, relational market becomes synonymous to spot
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market exchange such that ΠD|RM(r) = ΠD|SM for r > r̂RM . 2
Proof of Proposition 3.
First, note that Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM implies Π¯U = (∆E)2/(2cU). Cost minimization requires the
downstream party to set PL such that the upstream’s participation constraint (17) becomes
binding. By substituting e∗U = ∆Pµ/cU in (17) and solving for PL, one get
PL =
1
2cU
(∆E)2 − 1
2cU
(∆P )2. (49)
Suppose for a moment that (19) is satisfied for the optimal premium ∆P ∗. Substituting PL
and e∗U in the downstream’s objective function leads to the simplified problem
max
∆P
ΠD|RM = IL +
1
cU
∆I∆P − 1
2cU
(∆E)2 − 1
2cU
(∆P )2. (50)
The first-order condition yields ∆P ∗ = ∆I . Thus, the downstream’s expected profit is
ΠD|RM = IL +
1
2cU
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] . (51)
By substituting ΠD|RM and ∆P ∗ = ∆I in (19), we get the threshold interest rate rRM :
r ≤ 1
2cU∆I
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2 − 2cU
(
Π˜RM − IL
)]
≡ rRM . (52)
If r > rRM , the efficient premium ∆P ∗ = ∆I (and any higher premium ∆P > ∆P ∗) would
violate (19). In this case, the downstream party chooses the highest feasible ∆P such that
(19) becomes binding. Let ∆P ∗(r) denote the highest feasible premium which solves (19),
or equivalently,
(∆P )2 − 2(∆I − rcU)∆P + (∆E)2 + 2cU
(
Π˜RM − IL
)
= 0. (53)
Solving for ∆P gives
∆P ∗(r) = ∆I − rcU ±
[
(∆I − rcU)2 − (∆E)2 − 2cU
(
Π˜RM − IL
)] 1
2
. (54)
Again, it is optimal to choose the highest feasible ∆P , implying that the upper bound is
relevant. Note however, that there exits only a solution to (54) if
(∆I − rcU)2 − (∆E)2 − 2cU
(
Π˜RM − IL
)
≥ 0. (55)
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Rearranging (55) yields the lower threshold interest rate r̂RM :
r ≤ ∆I
cU
± 1
cU
[
(∆E)2 + 2cU
(
Π˜RM − IL
)] 1
2 ≡ r̂RM . (56)
Observe that the upper bound of r̂RM implies ∆P < 0, which cannot be a solution. Hence,
the lower bound of r̂RM is relevant. Substituting ∆P ∗(r) for rRM < r ≤ r̂RM in the
downstream’s objective function yields
ΠD|RM(r) = r
[
∆I − rcU +
[
(∆I − rcU)2 − (∆E)2 − 2cU
(
Π˜RM − IL
)] 1
2
]
+Π˜RM . (57)
Finally, if r > r̂RM , every ∆P > 0 would violate (19). Therefore, the downstream party
is forced to set ∆P ∗ = 0. As a result, relational market becomes equivalent to spot market
exchange such that ΠD|RM(r) = ΠD|SM for r > r̂RM . 2
Comparison of Relational Market and Relational Integration.
Consider first the case Π˜RM = ΠD|SM . Then, ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RI is equivalent to
(∆E)2 + 2∆I cosϕ∆E + 4cUIL − (∆I)2 (3− 2cU) ≤ 0. (58)
First, we can treat (58) as an equality. By applying the quadratic formula one get
∆E = −∆I cosϕ±
√
(∆I)2 cos2 ϕ− 4cUIL + (∆I)2 (3− 2cU). (59)
Since ∆E > 0, the upper bound is relevant. Thus, ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RI requires
(∆E)2 ≤
[[
(∆I)2 cos2 ϕ+ (∆I)2 (3− 2cU)− 4cUIL
] 1
2 −∆I cosϕ
]2
≡ Φ. (60)
In case Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM , it can be shown that ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RI is equivalent to
(∆E)2 ≤ 1
2
(∆I)2 (2− cU) ≡ Φ. (61)
2
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Proof of Proposition 4.
Suppose first that r ≤ ri, i = RM,RI . Then, it is necessary to identify whether the down-
stream party prefers different relational contracts for the same value of (∆E)2, but different
values of r. To do so, consider first the intervals 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ,
where ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RI . Suppose for a moment that rRM ≥ rRI , which is equivalent to
ΠD|RM − Π˜RM
∆I
≥
2
[
ΠD|RI − Π˜RI
]
∆I
. (62)
Note that rRM ≥ rRI further implies Π˜RM = max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SI} and Π˜RI = ΠD|RM .
Thus, (62) simplifies to
3ΠD|RM ≥ 2ΠD|RI + max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SI}, (63)
which is satisfied in the intervals 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ. Thus, rRM ≥ rRI
in these two intervals. Because ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RI in these two intervals, the downstream party
chooses relational market if r ≤ rRM . Next, consider the intervals Φ < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ and
Φ < (∆E)2, where ΠD|RI > ΠD|RM . Suppose for a moment that rRI ≥ rRM , which implies
Π˜RI = max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SI} and Π˜RM = ΠD|RI . Consequently, rRI ≥ rRM is equivalent to
3ΠD|RI ≥ 2ΠD|RM + max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SI}, (64)
which is satisfied in the intervals Φ < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ and Φ < (∆E)2 since ΠD|RI ≥ ΠD|RM .
Consequently, rRI ≥ rRM in these two intervals. Because ΠD|RI ≥ ΠD|RM in these two inter-
vals, the downstream party chooses relational integration if r ≤ rRI . Finally, by substituting
the respective fallback profits in rRM and rRI , we obtain
rRM =

1
8cU∆I
[∆Iµ−∆Eω]2 , if Π˜RM = ΠD|SM
1
2cU∆I
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] , if Π˜RM = ΠD|SI , (65)
rRI =
∆I
2
− 2
∆I
[
max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SI} − IL
]
. (66)
Next, consider the case ri < r ≤ r̂ i, i = RM,RI . Recall that ΠD|RM(r) ≥ ΠD|RI(r) in
the intervals 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r) and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r), where the thresholds Ψ(r) and
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Ψ(r) are valid for all r ∈ (ri, r̂ i], i = RM,RI . Since the credible incentive schemes β∗(r)
and ∆P ∗(r) are decreasing in r for ri < r ≤ r̂ i, i = RM,RI , the downstream’s expected
profits ΠD|RI(r) and ΠD|RM(r) are also decreasing in r. Hence, it is necessary to identify
the threshold interest rate r¯ i, where the downstream party is indifferent between the optimal
relational contract (relational integration or relational market) and the best spot alternative
(spot integration or spot market). Consider first relational integration. Suppose for a moment
that r¯RI < r̂RI . This would imply that ΠD|RI(r¯RI) > Π˜RI , which is equivalent to
r¯RI
2
[
∆I − r¯RI + 2
[
1
4
(
∆I − r¯RI)2 + IL − Π˜RI] 12] > 0
⇔ 1
4
(
∆I − r¯RI)2 + IL − Π˜RI > 1
4
(
∆I − r¯RI)2 . (67)
Since Π˜RI ≥ IL, it follows that r¯RI < r̂RI can never be satisfied. Thus, r¯RI ≥ r̂RI , i.e.
r̂RI is the relevant threshold interest rate for relational integration. Hence, the downstream
party chooses relational integration for all r ≤ r̂RI in the relevant intervals. By utilizing
the same approach as for relational integration, one can verify that the downstream party
prefers relational market for all r ≤ r̂RM in the relevant intervals. Finally, by substituting the
respective fallback profits in r̂RM and r̂RI , one get
r̂RM =

∆I
cU
− 1
cU
[
1
4
(∆Iµ+ ∆Eω)2 +
1
2
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2]] 12 , if Π˜RM = ΠD|SM
1
cU
[∆I −∆E] , if Π˜RM = ΠD|SI ,
r̂RI = ∆I − 2 [max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SI} − IL] 12 .
2
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